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The purpose of this study is to examine the Sino*- 
Soviet rivalry in Africa and quantify levels of Chinese 
and Soviet involvement in thirty-two African nations in 
order to determine if a correlation exists with United 
Nations voting. Africa in the 1970"s has been an 
important focus of the Chinese and Soviet efforts to gain 
support in this dispute. Military involvement and trade, 
as well as aid programs, have been an integral part of 
this competition for support.
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THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE IN AFRICA 
1974-1978
Introduction
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My purpose in undertaking this particular study is to 
examine the relationship between Soviet and Chinese aid 
disbursements and voting in the United Nations. Africa, as 
an area of intense competition between these two communist
powers, provides an interesting case study. By
quantitatively assessing a wide variety of Soviet and 
Chinese resource allocations to the thirty-two nations under 
consideration, I will be able to establish a scale which 
will indicate the degree of involvement (the independent 
variable) of the communist powers in these countries. While 
these scales will not directly measure influence, they 
should serve as a rough indicator of the presence of 
potential influence.
While common sense leads us to expect a correlation 
between high levels of aid and General Assembly voting, this 
study will demonstrate conclusively that this was not the 
case in sub-Saharan Africa from 1974 to 1978. High levels of
resource allocation did not necessarily correspond with high
indices, of voting agreement.
A number of studies have attempted to examine the 
relationship between aid receipts and UN voting. However, 
none of these has examined a broad range of issues and a
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large number of recipient nations chosen on a regional 
basis. This study is therefore unique. While limited to a 
particular region, it utilizes a large number of subjects 
over an extended time frame. The years 1974 to 1978 were 
chosen because they comprised the most recent five year 
period for which the necessary data was available. It should 
be noted that the peculiar aspects of the region may make 
the results of this particular study inapplicable to other 
regions. The results are general; therefore specific cases 
may not conform to the norm. For example, China's aid and 
voting relationships with South-East Asian nations can be 
expected to vary from the general pattern found with nations 
of sub-Saharan Africa. It would seem that geographical 
proximity is an important factor in such relationships. 
Indeed, the remoteness of the region may be one reason why 
the correlation found in this study was so low.
My thesis, briefly stated, is that Chinese and Soviet aid 
to sub-Saharan Africa, donated in an often competitive 
fashion, was used in the hope of gaining some level of 
diplomatic support in the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute. By 
establishing an empirical basis for quantifying aid 
relationships, I was able to demonstrate how successful, or 
unsuccessful, these resource allocations have been in terms 
of generating diplomatic support, which is measured by year 
to year analyses of General Assembly voting.
Tentatively, one is inclined to presume that a
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correlation would naturally exist between aid received and 
diplomatic support generated. As seen in Chapter Five, 
recent literature implies this relationship but without 
confirming it. A correlation, in fact, cannot generally be 
found. For this reason, the "value" of resource allocations 
as a political or diplomatic tool in terms of generating 
influence would appear to be limited. United Nations voting 
may not be the proper measurement for influence because 
diplomatic support gained by the provision of aid may be 
expressed through other channels, such as non-aligned 
conf erences .
The perceived relationship between resource outlays and 
diplomatic support seems to be a key feature of the Sino~ 
Soviet rivalry in Africa because that rivalry is so often 
expressed in polemical terms. China and the Soviet Union 
have seemed to seek statements of support, which have 
occured infrequently. The nations in question have seemed 
reluctant to openly express their support for either of the 
communist superpowers. Their attitude is similar to that 
often expressed towards the East-West ideological struggle: 
a desire to remain non-aligned and profit from relations 
with both parties. Major commitments to one side or the 
other have been extremely r„are.
This thesis will examine Sino-Soviet relations with the 
region in a broader context as well as providing specific 
statistical data for the five-year period 1974-78. It will
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indicate the levels of aid donated by the USSR and the PRC, 
as well as the benefits that seem to have been enjoyed as a 
result of that aid. It will examine the general history of 
Sino-Soviet relations with Africa and the specific events of 
the 1975-78 period in Chapters One and Two. The problem of 
measuring influence and a method for doing so ate explained 
in Chapters Three and Four. The results and my conclusion 
are presented in Chapters Five and Six.
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C^hapter One 
Chinese and Soviet Involvement 
in Africa: The Set ting
George T. Yu describes two levels of the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry in Africa. On one level, the communist powers
attempt to "win friends and inluence people" by formal and
informal political interaction, economic aid, military 
assistance and other activities. On another level, the two 
attack one another's motives in Africa. These two levels of 
competition have been observable since the early 1960's when 
China began to denounce the Third World policies of the 
USSR, in addition to those of the US.(l)
Both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) have important objectives and goals in Africa, and 
these often lead to a subtle kind of conflict or 
competition. China's goals have tended to be more general, 
in that it was attempting to shed the isolation cast upon it
largely under the leadership of the United States. China's
main concern was to cultivate friendship with the newly 
independent states of Africa in an effort to gain diplomatic 
support in its ongoing attempt to achieve recognition as the 
legitimate representative of the Chinese people. Until 1971, 
when communist China finally received the necessary two- 
thirds vote to replace the Nationalist Chinese at the United
Nations, the cultivation of diplomatic support was its most 
important objective, as it may well still be.
Given the geographical distances involved, the PRC has 
had few strategic goals in Africa- Although trade and the 
importation of some strategic raw materials from Africa (for 
example, copper from Zambia) are important, China's economic 
interests, while steadily growing, are still fairly small in 
comparison to those of the West. The most important general 
objective of Chinese foreign policy in Africa has been the 
establishment of some type of "Third World brethren" 
relationship with the nations of the continent. By
identifying strongly with African nations against the past
exploitations of imperialism and the present injustices of 
neo-colonialism, the PRC has attempted to gain a leadership 
position in the Third World. In this effort it has enjoyed 
limited success, especially in the 1960's. African nations 
have been less inclined to support Peking's more recent
pronouncements, which tend to identify the Soviet Union as 
the new ("social-imperialist”) empire seeking world-wide 
hegemony.
In the 1960's, and to a lesser extent in the 1970's,
China has also supported wars wars of liberation. This
support was both an ideological measure designed to aid
insurrections against colonialism as well as an attempt to
gain influence in any future government should the
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insurrection succeed. The Chinese favored the use of their 
model of peasant revolution, for it supported their 
ideological viewpoint against that of the USSR, and they 
were willing to support guerrilla organizations that were 
leftist-oriented. The objective of promoting armed struggle 
became more and more passe' as, throughout the 1960's, 
almost all of the colonies became independent. Also, this 
policy often had negative repercussions once the newly
established nation-states began to view the continuation of 
such movements as destabilizing. The promotion of national 
liberation movements became increasingly less of a priority 
goal for the PRC.
While the objectives of China have changed in the past 
twenty years, a constantly recurring theme (although to a
lesser extent in the period 1965-1968) has been the desire
to establish and maintain good relations with as many
African nations as possible. Initially this motivation was 
directed at the cold war enemy, the United States, but soon 
China began to seek support in her war of polemics with the 
Soviet Union. At the very least, China has sought a neutral 
position from these countries in terms of the Sino-Soviet 
dispute. Although Thomas Kanza sees China as attempting to 
"pave the way for a new alliance of the hungry nations and 
colored people,"(2) Chinese leaders are ultimately too 
pragmatic to envision this as a real possibility.
The goals of the Soviet Union in Africa have also varied
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greatly. In the late 1950's and early 1960's Russia 
appeared bent on generously supporting regimes that seemed 
to be socialist or at least leftist. This policy was also 
aimed at maintaining friendly relations and gaining 
diplomatic support in the war of words with the US and later 
with the PRC. Instituted under the aegis of Khrushchev, this 
policy involved the implementation of large aid programs for 
"progressive" African regimes.
A realization that the return for such aid was often 
negligible led the Soviet Union in the late 1960's to 
concentrate on aid designed to promote trade that would 
benefit the Soviet economy. This was a policy of greater 
pragmatism designed to maximize returns. One desired return 
continued to be support, or at least a neutral stance, in 
the Sino-Soviet conflict.
Another goal of Soviet foreign policy in Africa concerned 
strategic objectives. This seems to have become of primary 
interest in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Access to 
military facilities in Africa became important in the global 
struggle with the US. Kanza sees Soviet policy as 
preoccupied with combatting US and Chinese influence. He 
feels that the USSR maintains a "permanent vigilance to 
exploit in favor of the Soviet Union and the socialist 
ideology any situation which shows signs of opposition to 
Western imperialism, to Western influence in general, and to 
Chinese influence in particular."(3)
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Three objectives are paramount in describing or analyzing 
the goals of the Soviet Union in Africa: 1) ideological, 2)
strategic, and 3) economic. Ideological considerations seem 
to have been of primary importance in the early 1960's. 
Economic factors were emphasized in the late 1960's and 
early 1970's, and since the early 1970's, strategic 
considerations have been paramount.
In the 1950's, the Sino-Soviet rivalry was not yet 
extended to Africa for several reasons. The rivalry was 
still in its early stages and had not yet been revealed to 
the world. China and the Soviet Union had not begun actively 
to seek supporters. Just as important is the fact that 
China had little in the way of relations with an Africa that 
was still ruled largely by Europeans. "Initially, a positive 
African policy was nonexistent. Apart from the question of 
geographical distance, the new regime was not yet strong 
enough to adopt any meaningful policy towards Africa."(4)
By the early 1960's, China had begun to establish a 
"positive African policy" that centered on her desire to 
break the diplomatic isolation in which she found herself. 
Ogunsanwo notes that "China sought the friendship of the new 
African states to counter the United States' efforts begun 
in the 1950's to isolate her."(5) Opportunities abounded for 
supporting liberation movements as well as newly independent 
regimes.
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This period also witnessed a burst of Soviet activity in 
Africa. According to John Esseks, this activity was 
promoted by "optimism among some Soviet leaders that the new 
African states - with their grievances against the Western 
exmetropoles, their typically weak indigenous business 
classes, their traditions of communal land tenure, and 
related characteristics - would tend towards collaboration 
with Communist countries."(6) These hopes later proved to be 
short-sighted, but Khrushchev felt that so-called "national 
democratic states" like Ghana, Guinea, and Mali would 
eventually become full-fledged members of the socialist 
community. Such expectations were never fulfilled, and 
governments in both Ghana and Mali were soon toppled by 
military coups.
While China's foreign policy, in Africa and elsewhere, 
was effectively curtailed in the years 1965-68 by the 
Cultural Revolution, the Soviet Union began to take a more 
pragmatic attitude toward Africa. Greater stress on economic 
and strategic considerations became prevalent. The Soviets 
increasingly disbursed resources only if they seemed likely 
to gain some definite return. What John D. Esseks calls 
"the apparent contracting of Soviet aid efforts in 
Africa"(7) resulted from the small return on prior Soviet 
investments. The late 1960's witnessed a cutback in Soviet 
aid, and a greater interest in economic and strategic 
returns seemed to dominate policy-making.
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For various reasons, including Soviet disillusionment and 
Chinese isolationism, the communist powers de-emphasized 
their African programs in the latter half of the decade. In 
this period, both nations consolidated their efforts towards 
a few "target states.," where it was felt that the rewards 
would be greater. Examples of this beginning in 1969 are 
Somalia for the USSR and Tanzania for the PRC.
The importance of trade and the procurement of mineral 
resources began to be more heavily emphasized. According to 
Ogunsanwo, "Although in absolute terms China's share of 
Africa's market was still very small, by the end of 1970 it 
had shown a significant expansion, which could be expected 
to continue in the future."(8) Soviet trade with Africa, and 
especially exports to the continent, also increased 
substantially in this period.(9)
By the beginning of the 1970's, China had regained much 
of the diplomatic initiative lost during its Cultural 
Revolution. Improved relations with Black Africa were 
essential as China finally gained admission to the United 
Nations. In 1971, six African nations recognized the PRC for 
the first time, bringing the number with which China had 
relations to twenty-three. The Third World vote in general, 
and the African vote in particular, assured gaining the two- 
thirds majority necessary in September 1971 for China's 
admission to and Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations. 
Ogunsanwo notes that "in its political relations with the
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African states, China adopted an attitude aimed at obtaining 
diplomatic recognition."(10)
If this was indeed the major goal of Chinese African 
policy in the 1960's (with the exception of the 1965-68 
period), then that policy was successful by the end of 1971. 
The PRC continued to make progress in replacing the Taiwan 
regime as the single representative of China throughout the 
1970's. Nineteen African nations recognized the PRC during 
the decade, bringing the total to forty-two.
George T. Yu maintains that the 1970's witnessed a great 
growth of Chinese activity in Africa, but the same can 
probably also be said about the USSR. This increased 
activity can be seen as a manifestation of the rivalry, 
although the Soviet Union seems to have more concrete goals 
than merely gaining support in the dispute. According to Yu, 
"Africa in the 1970's has emerged as an area of strong 
contention between China and the USSR, and China has managed 
to bolster its position on the continent considerably at 
least in terms of establishing an economic presence and 
increased formal acceptance."(11)
It would appear that whatever gains China may have made 
in terms of trade, aid and recognition, its second-class
status was assured by the massive level of Soviet arms
transfers to Africa. Whatever influence China may gain as
the "chief Communist (economic) aid donor to African
countries,"(12) would seem to be outweighed by the
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substantial military presence the Soviet Union has 
maintained in Africa. China's activity in terms of arms 
transfers has been limited in the 1970's, with Zaire and 
Tanzania the principal recipients of Chinese military goods 
and supplies during the decade.
Richard Staar sees "much of what the Russians are doing
in black Africa as being motivated by, and, indeed,
remaining directly related to strategic military 
objectives."(13) He feels that the massive infusion of 
Soviet weaponry in Africa is designed to gain specific 
strategic objectives, although he also notes more generally
the "growing rivalry between Moscow and Peking to 'win
hearts and minds' throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America."(14)
Also in the 1970's, the PRC began actively to protest 
Soviet involvement in the Third World in general and in 
Africa in particular. "Soviet pressure against vulnerable 
locations in Asia and Africa was interpreted as striving to 
create a situation to outflank Europe from the North and 
South."(15) China herself maintained very close relations 
with Tanzania, Zambia, and Zaire. Although suffering in the 
contest for influence from a lack of resources, the PRC, 
unlike the USSR, has benefited from policies that stress its 
identification with the Third World.
David Twining perceives a new, more dangerous pattern of 
Soviet activity in the Third World, and especially Africa,
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that began in the mid - 1970's. "The key feature of this 
new pattern which distinguishes it markedly from Soviet 
involvement of the past is the increased role and larger 
scale of involvement by Soviet, East European and Cuban 
military forces."(16) While Twining's own orientation is 
worth noting (he is a major in the US Army) he is correct in 
pointing out the greater use of military power, usually 
through proxies, by the USSR in Africa. Especially in Angola 
and Ethiopia, Soviet involvement has been instrumental in 
either the installation and/or the maintenance of a pro- 
Soviet regime.
In Angola, which achieved independence on November 11, 
1975, the Soviet Union's intervention through Cuban proxies 
led directly to the victory of the MPLA, led by Augustinho 
Neto. An estimated 1,000 Soviet advisors, 20,000 Cuban 
troops and 10,000 Eastern Bloc technicians have continued to 
prop up the government, which has been unable to establish 
its authority over large sections of the countryside. While 
the contribution of the Soviet Union and Cuba in shoring up 
the regime is clear, it is important to note that economic 
and diplomatic contacts with the West are still of great 
importance to the regime of Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who 
became President after Neto's death in 1978.
In Ethiopia, the (eventually) Marxist government of Haile 
Mariam Mengistu deposed Emperor Haile Selassie in September 
of 1974. Enormous infusions of Soviet military aid,
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including a force of some 10,000 Cubans, were instrumental 
in defeating Somalia in the Ogaden War of 1977-78. The 
Cubans have remained, and have been joined by 1,000 or more 
Soviet civilian and military advisors. In November, 1978, a 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between 
Ethiopia and the Soviet Union.
Since the late 1950's and the early 1960's, both China 
and the Soviet Union have attempted to translate the 
allocation of resources, usually in the form of aid or 
military transfers, into influence. With the development of 
the Sino-Soviet rivalry into an open ideological conflict, 
these attempts to gain influence received the added impetus 
of a need to find supporters or, at least, to attempt to 
limit support for the opposition.
More recently, both nations, and especially the USSR,
have concentrated their efforts on a few "target states" 
where the risks and returns would presumably be 
proportionately lower and higher, respectively. Greater 
resources have given the Soviet Union an advantage in 
projecting its influence in Africa. Yu points out that "with 
the heavy internal demands on its scarce resources, its 
shortage of modern arms and its limited capacity to project 
its power abroad, China has found itself severely restricted 
in trying to fulfill what Africans regard as their 
requirements."(17)
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What aids China is often the attitudes of the Africans, 
who tend to identify China with the Third World, while the 
USSR, as a European power and a developed nation, is more 
easily seen as imperialistic. African nations desire aid, 
but they do not want strings attached that may lead to any
sort of dependent relationship. Hutchison notes that
numerous governments have praised Chinese assistance as 
being completely free of political strings and also that 
"aid from China has been useful, apt, given on more generous 
terms than by any other donor - and it has been welcomed, 
and praised, by nearly every African nation that has 
received it."(18) Hutchison feels that China is able to do 
this because it is not always seeking tangible or specific 
goals. Besides the moral support China has received, he 
claims that the PRC has gained tangible benefits such as the 
African UN vote that led to its membership and the growth of 
a healthy two-way trade. "No nation has as yet provided what 
would, in Peking, be considered the ultimate political 
payoff: full endorsement of China's viewpoint in the Sino- 
Soviet dispute."(19)
Although the Soviet Union clearly holds most of the cards 
in terms of the resources it can apply to Africa, China, by 
pursuing good relations through careful, generous and
largely unconditional aid, has been able to gain a large 
measure of goodwill on the continent. While enjoying no 
potential "client states" in Africa, China maintains 
excellent relations with a large number of nations and
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receives intangible benefits that accrue from such 
relations. The Chinese have generally been successful in 
convincing Africans of their genuine desire for friendship 
and have largely avoided the temptation to apply pressure
for specific benefits. This approach has served Chinese
interests well over the long haul, and it is to be expected 
that it will be continued.
The Soviet Union's present policy of concentrating on a 
few major "target states" also seems destined to continue. 
The USSR will gain little from these relationships despite 
the enormous expenditures involved in supporting such 
regimes. This is because no African government, no matter
how authoritarian it may be, can afford to be seen by its
people as dependent on the USSR. In the long run, Angola and 
Ethiopia will perceive,as did Somalia in 1977, that their 
national interest is not congruent to that of the Soviet 
Union, and the result will be the end of that particular 
special relationship* Unlike Cuba, another Third World 
nation that has maintained its relationship over a long 
period with the Soviet Union, these African nations are not 
economically dependent on the USSR, nor do they seek 
protection from a powerful and hostile neighbor. Their 
national security is not directly tied to their relationship 
with the Soviet Union, as is the case with Cuba.
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Chapter Two 
The Sino-Soviet Rivalry 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
1974-1978
During the 1974 to 1978 period, sub-Saharan Africa
emerged as a flashpoint of the Sino-Soviet conflict. China
and the Soviet Union had, largely for the same reasons,
deemphasized this region in the late 1960"s and early
197CTs. The PRC found it necessary to curtail its diplomatic
activities because of the Cultural Revolution and the
chronic political instability that continued until after
Mao"s death in 1976. The Soviet Union, disappointed with the
meagre results of extensive aid programs in the 1960's,
began to make commitments on a far more rational and limited
basis in the early 1970"s. Kanet and Ipatov conclude:
"In the 1970"s, Africa has re-emerged as an 
area of important Soviet interest... instru­
ments employed by the Soviets in their 
attempt to accomplish their foreign policy 
goals in Africa...have been the provision 
of economic assistance and the expansion 
of trade relations with African countries, 
arms transfers and military aid, and a 
variety of forms of political support."(1)
The Soviets began to take a more pragmatic attitude toward
Africa. A willingness to work with any type of government,
regardless of ideological incompatabilities, appeared as the
Soviets strove to gain concrete benefits in the region.
PAGE 21
Attempts to promote "national-socialist" governments became 
largely a thing of the past, although ideology was still 
frequently used to justify Russian actions.
Strategic interests often seemed to guide Soviet actions, 
including a desire to gain and maintain logistical support 
bases for air and sea patrols in the Indian and South 
Atlantic Oceans. While the PRC appears to have few strategic 
interests in Africa, Africa is regarded as an important
battleground against Soviet hegemonism. (2) Peking's
interest in Africa seemed at times to be a response to 
Soviet activity in the region.
In the 1970's, China and the Soviet Union competed,
especially in southern Africa, by backing rival factions of
various liberation movements. Initially, China was quite
successful in this regard. "From the Soviet standpoint,
China has come to constitute a serious obstacle to the
USSR's efforts to win recognition as the patron of the
national liberation movement in Africa."(3) This situation
changed as the Soviet Union dramatically increased its
presence on the continent. According to Kanet and Ipatov,
this change resulted from several events which increased the
Soviet ability to play a major role in Africa.
"In recent years, the overthrow of the 
Portuguese colonial empire, the increasing 
instability of the white-ruled countries 
in southern Africa, and the coup that 
deposed Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia 
have provided the Soviets with opportun­
ities to expand their involvement in the 
affairs of the continent."(4)
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China reacted to the increasing Soviet presence in Africa 
by turning toward anti-Soviet regimes and by backing 
insurgencies against Soviet-supported governments. This sort 
of "reactive” policy could conceivably have endangered 
China's diplomatic successes in the region. According to 
Warren Weinstein, "the intense preoccupation with Soviet and 
Cuban involvement in Africa may well prove to be a critical 
obstacle to continued Chinese successes in Africa."(5)
During the period in question, the Soviet presence in 
sub-Saharan Africa increased dramatically. By 1978, the 
Soviet Union, largely through intervention and arms 
transfers, had established a strong position on the 
continent. Kanet and Ipatov see this trend continuing into 
the foreseeable future, and they note that the USSR now has 
the ability to influence events in most areas of the 
continent. The future will probably witness continued 
efforts by the Russians to solidify and enlarge their role 
in the area. (6)
China was able to do significantly better than the USSR 
with respect to economic aid. Since 1970, the PRC has become 
the principal communist donor of economic aid to Africa. 
Soviet economic aid decreased as a greater emphasis began to 
be placed on military and political contacts. "The early 
1970's witnessed a continuing decline in the relative 
position of Africa in Soviet assistance programs, with 
commitments to Africa representing only 7.5 percent of new
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aid."(7) While Soviet economic aid allocations to Africa 
increased in the mid-1970's to about 40 percent of their 
total aid given, China's aid program was clearly superior to 
that of the Soviet Union. "Considering its limited 
resources, the PRC has dispensed aid widely and generously 
in Africa, especially in the form of grants and interest 
free loans repayable over extended time with long grace 
periods."(8)
There is little doubt that some political rewards, 
although these may have been limited, sprang from China's 
generous provision of economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa. 
George T. Yu describes China's excellent relations with 
Zambia and Tanzania as partially an outgrowth of China's 
financial and material support for the construction of the 
impressive Tanzam railway. This expensive project,
involving over 10,000 Chinese laborers and technicians, was 
completed on July 14, 1976. Despite the success of the
massive undertaking, Yu feels that the 1974-78 period 
witnessed an overall decline in Chinese aid commitments to 
Africa. In the future, "new commitments were certain to be 
fewer and more modest." Yu cites several reasons for this, 
including: 1) China's own development needs; 2) the 'four
modernizations' program initiated by the Teng regime in 
China; 3) adverse experiences with aid given to Albania and 
Vietnam ($5 billion and $10 billion, respectively); and 4) a 
general questioning by China's elites of the return on 
economic aid. (9)
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From 1974 to 1978, trade continued to be of relatively 
little importance in the relations between the communist 
powers and Africa. China's trade with Africa exceeded that 
of the Soviet Union, but both were limited, with the Soviet 
total being only about one percent of total Soviet world 
trade. While there were isolated cases of more important 
trade connections, Soviet and Chinese trade with Africa was 
generally of little importance. African nations continued 
to look to the Western industrial powers for technology and 
development materials.
Often, and especially in the Soviet case, the aid offered 
was designed to increase trade eventually. An example of 
this can be seen in Guinea, where extensive Soviet aid was 
instrumental in developing the mining of bauxite, which has 
since become one of the Soviet Union's major imports from 
Africa. Soviet trade patterns in the 1970's seem to be 
largely guided by economic needs. "In general, Soviet trade 
in recent years has been based on economic criteria of 
interest to the Soviets themselves, and not primarily on 
political considerations."(10)
It is in the area of military involvement that the USSR 
has far outstripped Chinese activities in Africa, and this 
is probably the major reason why the Soviet Union has 
enjoyed recent successes on the continent. Smaldone cites 
"...the ascendance of military aid as the premier instrument 
of Moscow's African policy."(11) While the Soviet Union has
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embarked on a massive and unprecedented program of arms 
exports to Africa, the Chinese have also increased the size 
of their military aid commitments to Africa, although in 
relative terms their programs have been far less obtrusive
than those of the USSR. The Chinese programs have not
altered local military balances, nor have they attracted 
international attention, as have those of the Soviet Union. 
(1 2)
One important reason for the increase in this type of 
Soviet activity, according to Colin Legum, is that "some
African nations, anxious to buttress their own weak power,
have weakened their commitment to genuine nonalignment and
Pan-Africanism and have enlisted the support of major
extracontinental powers."(13) The Soviet Union has often 
been willing to make arms readily available to such African 
purchasers. The USSR's ability to respond promptly and 
often sympathetically to African arms orders, to undercut 
other sellers and offer convenient credit terms and to 
deliver quickly is appreciated by buyers. (14) Soviet arms 
sales provide an important source of hard currency for the 
beleaguered Russian economy, even when concessionary sales 
terms are offered, as they often are to African nations.
From 1974 to 1978, Soviet military involvement in sub- 
Saharan Africa increased dramatically. Several billion 
dollars worth of weapons systems were sent to the region,
with the largest amounts going to Ethiopia and Angola. In
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addition, thousands of Soviet advisors were stationed in the 
region while almost 40,000 Cuban troops saw action there. 
According to Smaldone, this policy of increasing military 
involvement seems to have been an unqualified success for 
the USSR. "It is clear that Soviet military aid diplomacy in 
Africa since the 1-960" s has made remarkable gains by 
competing against and displacing Western suppliers(15)
The Soviet Union obviously feels that its interests are 
best served by military rather than economic involvement in 
the region. While economic aid exceeded military aid until 
1970, the reverse has since been true. Kanet and Ipatov note 
that "the (recent) expansion of Soviet involvement in Africa 
has been carried out far more through the provision of 
military assistance and political support than through a 
significant expansion of Soviet economic involvement."(16)
The Soviet military commitment in general, and arms 
transfers in particular, has easily overshadowed that of the 
PRC during this period. According to the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, in the period 1975-1979 the 
USSR sent almost a third of its $34 billion worth of total 
world arms transfers to Africa. In stark contrast, the PRC 
sent $150 million of its $750 million total to Africa. (1.7) 
Tanzania and Zaire have been the principal recipients of 
Chinese arms. In terms of acquiring arms, looking to Peking 
"is not as promising, because of China's inability to 
produce the kind of military logistical support that either
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of the superpowers can provide."(18)
According to Smaldone, there is a definite limit to the 
advantages the Soviet Union can achieve from its policies of 
military involvement in Africa. "That Moscow's military 
assistance program has yielded privileges and advantages 
cannot be disputed, but the Kremlin's position in Africa has 
proven to be only as strong as its clients, none of which 
have, or are likely to, become satellites."(19) As we shall 
see in the case of Somalia, and as was also readily 
observable in Egypt, military involvement in no way
guarantees long term benefits.
In several regions of sub-Saharan Africa, during the
period 1974-78, Soviet successes were met with Chinese 
resistance. It is important to examine more closely events 
in these areas and Chinese and Soviet involvement in these 
events. The areas where the Sino-Soviet dispute in Africa 
took its most violent form were southern Africa and the 
Horn.
In southern Africa, the Angolan Civil War of 1975-76 led
to a reduction of Chinese influence in the area. Daniel S.
Papp emphasizes "that China's position in southern Africa 
was very strong prior to the Angolan War."(20) The Chinese 
supported all three liberation groups that were fighting the 
Portuguese —  the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA —  although the most 
support went to the FNLA followed by UNITA. As the MPLA, 
under Augusthino Neto, moved closer to the USSR, China
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increasingly opposed it. "The victory of the MPLA weakened 
the Chinese position in southern Africa and led guerrilla 
organizations in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Namibia, and South 
Africa to turn increasingly toward the Soviet Union for 
material and financial support."(21) One exception proved to 
be Robert Mugabe's ZANU, supported by China, which was able 
to gain ascendancy in Zimbabwe in 1980.
Henriksen points out that the central reason the Soviet 
Union was able to involve itself militarily in the area was 
the local threat presented by the white minority regimes in 
Rhodesia and South Africa. "Peace and majority rule in 
southern Africa would remove much of the MPLA's and 
FRELIMO's need for common ground with the Soviet Union."(22) 
If Angola and Mozambique had not felt threatened by South 
Africa and Rhodesia, they would have been far less inclined 
to accept a close relationship with the USSR. The fear of 
military attack from South Africa and Rhodesia, and South 
Africa's support for insurgent groups, led Angola and 
Mozambique to desire continued Soviet military support.
In the case of Mozambique, which gained independence in 
1975, expectations concerning Soviet military and economic 
assistance were not fulfilled. Papp indicates that 
Mozambique probably expected a greater Soviet commitment 
militarily as a protection against Rhodesian security 
forces, which routinely attacked guerrilla camps within 
Mozambique. (23) Machel felt that his country needed Soviet
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weapons to defend against these frequent invasions. This 
need undoubtedly contributed to the close relations that 
developed between the two states. Still, Mozambique under 
Machel has proven to be less dependent on Moscow than has 
Angola. (24) This was largely because Mozambique had far 
less of a military threat with which to contend, and did not 
need Cuban troops, as did the Angolans. Although a Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in February of 1977 
with the Soviet Union, it by no means stopped Mozambique 
from enjoying important diplomatic and economic relations 
with other nations, including the PRC.
It is important to note that before independence China 
was the principal arms supplier to FRELIMO. Relations 
between China and Mozambique have generally been very good. 
Chinese construction workers built roads in Mozambique and 
the PRC provided economic aid. But China's inability, or 
refusal, to provide the desired arms package meant that 
Machel had little choice except to go to the USSR. The 
stronger relationship that developed with Russia was a 
result of the threat posed by the white—minority regimes in 
the region.
The Angolan Civil War of 1975-76 proved in some ways to 
be a local manifestation of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Of the 
three factions vying for political control in this war, 
China supported two: Holden Roberto's FNLA and, to a lesser
extent, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. Following the massive
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intervention of Cuban troops, the third organization, Neto's 
MPLA, achieved victory militarily in 1976. The PRC strongly 
protested the introduction of Cuban troops into Angola, as 
well as Soviet arms transfers to the MPLA.
China was not the only nation to complain about Soviet 
interventionism in the area. Locally, a number of nations 
(including, of course, South Africa and Rhodesia) saw the 
Soviet move as a threat to their own stability. Zambia's 
Kenneth Kaunda described the situation as "a plundering 
tiger with its deadly cubs now coming in through the back 
door."(25) Zambia supported the FNLA, and Chinese advisors 
trained FNLA recruits on Zambian soil. Zaire also strongly 
protested the Soviet involvement and continued to train 
UNITA guerrillas in Zaire, with Chinese instruction and 
assistance.
Legum feels that Soviet actions were taken partially in 
response to perceptions that the Chinese-backed FNLA and 
UNITA had formed an alliance to defeat the MPLA. (26) For 
their part, the Chinese responded to the MPLA's victory by 
forming closer ties with Zaire, which may well be the 
antithesis of a progressively governed nation. President 
Mobuto of Zaire was strongly anti-Soviet as well as anti- 
MPLA. Close relations with Zaire were uncharacteristic for 
Chinese foreign policy because of the nature of Mobuto's 
regime. Weinstein notes that "The Sino-Soviet competition 
for third world support has become the key political element
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in China's central African policy, and this has allowed for 
the narrowing of the policy differences between China and 
the United States in these countries."(27)
Angola, like Mozambique, has not become a Soviet 
satellite. If the Soviet Union intervened in Angola in the 
hope of monopolizing its abundant natural resources, than 
the Kremlin has been disappointed. Angola has continued to 
maintain important economic ties with the West. While the 
US did not recognize Neto's government, Gulf Oil continued 
to operate an important offshore concession near Cabinda. In 
October of 1976, Angola signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union. There has been little 
doubt that the MPLA is dependent on continued Soviet and 
Cuban support to maintain control of Angola. Although the 
degree of dependency is undoubtedly greater than that found 
in Mozambique, Angola should not be characterized as a 
satellite of the USSR.
The Angolan Civil War and the general state of tension 
that continued to exist in southern Africa contributed to a 
growth of the Soviet presence in the region. Simultaneously, 
China's position in the area worsened. The peaceful 
resolution of the Zimbabwe conflict under British auspices 
lessened the possibility of the Soviet Union gaining 
influence in that country, but the USSR still retained a 
dominant position in the area vis-a'-vis the Chinese.
PAGE 32
Conflict in the Horn of Africa was the eventual result of 
Soviet arms transfers to the Somali Republic, which had 
every intention of using those arms to make good on 
irredentist claims to the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The 
Soviet-Somali relationship deteriorated steadily as Soviet 
relations with Ethiopia improved in the wake of the coup 
that toppled Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. The Soviet- 
Somali relationship had included important concessions of a 
strategic nature, consisting of support facilities for 
Soviet air and naval forces. In return, large Soviet arms 
shipments went to Somalia. But in the mid-1970's, the 
relationship began to sour.
In February of 1977, Lt. Colonel Haile Mariam Mengistu 
came to power in Ethiopia and, soon after, Ethiopia 
announced that it would turn to the Soviet Union for arms. 
In March, Fidel Castro visited both Ethiopia and Somalia in 
an attempt to establish a "Pax Sovietica” in the region, but 
Somalia's Siad Barre was not interested. As the Soviet 
involvement with Ethiopia became more apparent, Somalia 
became more intransigent about her territorial claims. In 
July of 1977, Somali irregulars invaded the Ogaden province 
of Ethiopia. The USSR responded by cutting off arms 
shipments to Somalia.
As economic and diplomatic relations deteriorated with 
the USSR, the Chinese, who had maintained healthy relations 
with Somalia for some time, sought to increase their
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prestige at Moscow's expense. It was not difficult to 
condemn the Soviet Union under such circumstances; Barre was 
incensed with the Russian sellout. Henriksen takes note of a 
general policy of the PRC which applies in this instance. 
"China has been most active in winning friends among former 
pro-Soviet states."(28) A situation where the Soviets have 
been expelled provides an excellent opportunity for the PRC 
to attempt to improve its own standing.
On November 15, 1977, President Barre expelled the Soviet 
advisors from Somalia. Meanwhile, Ethiopia was moving closer 
to the USSR as Somali forces continued to occupy the Ogaden. 
In the same month, 400 Cuban advisors arrived in Ethiopia. 
By February, 1978, there were some 10,000 Cuban troops in 
Ethiopia. Soviet General Vasily Petrov was directing Cuban 
and Ethiopian forces in the field, and the USSR was flying 
in massive amounts of weaponry. By March of 1978, the Ogaden 
had been retaken.
Why did the Soviet Union abandon Somalia to form an 
alliance with Ethiopia? The Soviets probably distrusted 
Somali irredentism and did not want to be caught in a 
position of supporting an "unjust" war. The Somali invasion 
of the Ogaden clearly violated the Organization of African 
Unity's principle of the inviolablity of African borders. 
The opportunity to gain influence in Ethiopia seemed to be 
too good to miss. As a potential ally, Ethiopia had a great 
deal more to offer despite Somalia's naval facilities.
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Notwithstanding recent internal difficulties and 
instability, Ethiopia is a much larger and potentially more 
powerful nation than is Somalia.
From 1974 to 1978, the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Africa was 
altered dramatically as the Soviet Union improved its 
position substantially and as that of the PRC declined. To a 
large extent, these changes occurred as a direct result of 
the introduction of Soviet arms and advisors, as well as 
Cuban troops, into southern Africa and the Horn. It would 
be incorrect, however, to assume that the USSR maintains a 
vastly superior position in sub-Saharan Africa. China still 
has relations with more than forty African nations, and its 
prestige remains high. A number of nations that are anti- 
Soviet have looked to the PRC for aid. Chinese aid programs 
continued to draw praise, and trade with Africa easily 
exceeded that of the USSR.
Soviet "victories" in Africa may not be as important, in 
the long run, as China's steady establishment of strong 
bilateral relations with African states. The ideological 
affinity that nations like Mozambique and Ethiopia have with 
the Soviet Union may be less important than the Third-World 
ties that exist between China and Africa. "Mozambique, and 
Ethiopia to a lesser extent, developed their Marxist- 
Leninist ideology independent of Moscow, and it is therefore 
by no means a symbol of subservience or subjugation to the 
USSR."(29) It seems plausible to conjecture that African
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socialism may some day be as independent of Moscow as 
Yugoslav or Chinese communism is today. Soviet achievments 
in sub-Saharan Africa in the mid-1970's may well be reduced 
in the 1980's, especially if southern Africa is stabilized.
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Chapter Three 
Influence and the Problem 
of Measurement
The difficulty of measuring the influence that one nation 
has over another has been a long standing problem in the 
assessment of international relations. This difficulty arises 
in part from the impossibility of defining certain elements of 
influence in a quantitative fashion. Often political 
scientists have formulated theories of influence but have made 
no effort to make them quantitative. Levgold comments that 
foreign policy specialists have rarely wrestled with the 
problem of devising a conceptual scheme for analyzing or 
criteria for evaluating one nation's influence over 
another."(1) Rubinstein feels that ”A universally applicable 
system for assessing influence is beyond reach, given the wide 
variations existing between nation-states.(2) The greatest 
problem lies in finding a means of determining what 
constitutes the evidence of influence. After this, a means of 
evaluating these various types of evidence is necessary so 
that "levels of influence" can be established that provide us 
with an accurate measure of intergovernmental influence.
The main problem, that of determining the evidence or the
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bases of influence, has proven to be quite difficult. Of 
further difficulty is the establishment of quantitative 
values for these bases. Many of these have proven hard to 
discern as well as to quantify. One example would be the 
"prestige" that one particular nation enjoys in the eyes of 
another, for this concept is difficult to define in a narrow 
sense as well as being impossible to quantify.
Before reviewing attempts to establish the bases of 
influence, it is important to define and operationalize the 
term. Numerous definitions of influence have been 
constructed, some of which indirectly deal with the term, 
judging it to be a function of national power. Others 
establish influence conceptually but acknowledge the 
difficulty of applying such definitions. Levgold points out 
that "To define influence as the art of and success in 
affecting, altering, or controlling the action and attitudes 
of others immediately betrays the difficulty of giving the 
concept practical application."(3)
This problem is present in the definition provided by 
Rubinstein: "Influence is manifested when A affects through
non-military means, directly or indirectly, the behavior of 
B so that it redounds to the policy advantage of A."(4) This 
strong definition of influence introduces a criterion that 
precludes military pressure or dominance, or its threat, as 
bases of influence, something that the Hungarians and other 
East Europeans would probably disagree with, for Soviet
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military strength is an important component of Soviet 
domination of that region. The application of military 
power, or the threat of its application, seems to be an 
often-used means of gaining influence.
Felix Oppenheim provides us with a two-part definition of 
influence. The first defines influence in a negative sense. 
"P has influence over R's not doing x means that P performs 
some action y so that, were R to intend to do x, y would 
cause R not to do so x.”(5) In this definition, the 
application of influence dissuades R from taking a 
particular action, x. It has a negative sense because it 
effectively negates R's ability or desire to take x, 
whatever it may be.
The second half of this definition involves the 
application of influence in a positive sense, designed to 
promote, rather than stop, an action. "P influences R to do 
x means that P performs some action y involving a 
communication which causes R to choose x."(6) Oppenheim's 
definition is admirable because it outlines two forms of 
influence in a simple, concise fashion that appears to be 
applicable to the study of international relations. The 
difficulty lies in establishing that, with the negative 
application of influence, P's y causes R to refrain from x. 
The similar difficulty with the positive application of 
influence involves proving that P's y causes R to do x. 
Unfortunately, these problems are not only found in this
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particular definition; they consistently appear when one is 
trying to ascertain the presence of influence.
Since influence is fundamentally related to national 
power,some political scientists utilize power as a basis for 
defining influence. This unfortunately raises an additional 
problem, for if power cannot be applied, than it cannot 
produce influence. The bases of power are, however, stongly 
linked to the bases of influence, and for this reason it is 
important to understand influence as defined through 
national power. "Influence becomes both the application of 
power and the return from the application of power."(7)
P.H. Partridge considers power to be a highly inclusive 
term, incorporating an infinite number of levels sandwiched 
between the two poles of influence and domination. (8) 
Anthony de Crespigny asserts that "power" can be adequately 
substituted for "influence" and suggests seven forms of 
power, several of which seem pertinent to this discussion. 
Coercive and inducive power are defined as follows: 
"Coercive power is the capacity of A to get B to act in 
conformity with his intentions, and contrary to B's wishes, 
by making things unpleasant for B in order to secure his 
compliance or by threatening to make things unpleasant for B 
if he doesn't comply." (9) This is similar to the power that 
we would expect the PRC and the USSR to exercise in Africa, 
through the manipulation of economic or military programs. 
Inducive power is similar in that B acts in compliance with
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A's desires as a result of A's provision of some sort of 
reward. (10)
Also of interest is de Crespigny's sixth form of power, 
attrahent power, "which A is able to exercise because B 
loves him, is impressed by his personality, or desires to be 
like him." (11) Persuasive power, which precludes the use of 
threats or incentives, and attrahent power are important 
forms of power for the PRC because of its inability to 
provide high levels of material incentives.
Russett utilizes an inventory of the bases of influence 
and power to ascertain the influence potential of a nation, 
although he recognizes that such a list must be very broad 
in nature, which presents problems. His "checklist of the 
bases of influence is meant to be exhaustive, on which any 
specific instrument of influence could be placed."(12) 
Influence is defined on the basis of national power, 
compounded by adding many factors, including military power, 
wealth, distance, population and quality of human resources, 
to name a few. Russett's inclusion of military power 
contrasts with Rubinstein's deliberate exclusion of this 
most important resource.
In World Power Trends, Cline provides us with a 
"comprehensive assessment of national power that integrates 
the major geographic, economic, military and political 
factors in accordance with the leverage they are commonly 
perceived to exert in international affairs."(13) This
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"leverage" is equivalent to influence. Cline presents a
formula that combines five variables to create a unique
power rating. This formula can be applied to any nation* 
b
Unfortunately, its use of numerical values to describe 
several variables, strategic purpose and the will to pursue 
national objectives, is highly suspect. As an example of the 
results of Cline's formula, it finds the People's Republic 
of China (83) to be almost four times as powerful as Nigeria 
(22).
Problems arise not only with Cline's method, but with the 
larger difficulty of translating power into influence. While 
China is clearly more powerful than Nigeria, the application 
of that power, resulting in influence, cannot be taken for 
granted. Other factors must be considered. Despite Cline's 
results, the idea that China has the ability to strongly 
exert influence on Nigeria is clearly nonsensical, and Cline 
refrains from making any such claim. The additional factor 
that precludes China's ability in this sense is the enormous 
distance between the two nations. Clearly China is less able 
to bring its greater power to bear on Nigeria, than it is, 
for example, on Tibet. Cline's point may be that, all other 
things being equal, China has four times the ability of 
Nigeria to influence other nations. As noted earlier, 
Russett wisely includes distance as a basis of influence to 
avoid this problem.
Another problem with the means of defining influence
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provided by both Russett and Cline involves other, less 
tangible, bases. Factors such as respect, bonds of community 
and "rightness" are difficult to quantify, to say the least. 
These less tangible aspects can be important in terms of 
influence. Russett notes that "nations or leaders who are 
widely perceived as following right norms of behavior can 
exert important influence as a result."(14)
Another extremely important variable that must be 
considered when analyzing influence relationships between 
nation-states involves the diplomatic ability, or talent, 
that a nation displays in applying its influence or power 
bases to another nation. A number of political scientists 
have noted the importance of this factor in the extension of 
influence. Morgenthau calls this factor the "quality of 
diplomacy" and describes it as "the art of bringing the 
different elements of national power to bear with maximum 
effect upon those points in the international situation 
which concern the national interest most directly."(15) 
Quality diplomacy serves to focus national power and 
increase its ability to gain influence or other objectives.
In a similar vein, Russett sees the ability to change and 
adapt as crucial to the achievement of policy goals. "The 
ability to learn is the key element of influence. Nations 
like individuals must ultimately be able to change their 
methods, and even their goals, when earlier ones have 
outlived their usefulness."(16)
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The importance of such talents is so great that they can 
outweigh other, more tangible, resources or lack thereof. 
"By using the power potentialities of a nation to best 
advantage, a competent diplomacy can increase the power, and 
influence, of a nation beyond what one would expect it to be 
in view of all the other factors combined."(17) The 
importance of this component can be seen in Africa, where, 
according to Levgold, "China has outperformed the Soviet 
Union in applying its influence, at least in the basic sense 
of matching means to ends."(18) Overall, the quality of 
Chinese application of its more meagre resource base to 
Africa has successfully countered the Soviet emphasis on 
quantity.
In the same context as his positive and negative brands 
of influence, Oppenheim identifies two main methods of 
gaining, or attempting to gain, influence. These are 
punishments and threats of punishment, and rewards. Aid can 
be seen as both a reward and a threat, for it can surely be 
curtailed at any time. Russett notes several applicable 
means of threatening or applying pressure as a means of 
forcing a certain action. "A developed nation may withhold 
foreign aid from a poor one; one state may withdraw support 
from another's position on a pet issue at the United 
Nations."(19)
Punishment, or coercion, has been little used as a 
technique for gaining influence by either the USSR or China
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in Africa. Both nations recognize the difficulty of 
effectively applying pressure in Africa. "For either to 
begin throwing its weight around would complicate the 
celebration each makes of the natural alliance between 
socialism and these former, sometimes continuing victims of 
colonialism."(20)
It has already been mentioned that rewards automatically 
provide a potential means of punishment, although this may 
not be totally applicable in the African context. Rewards 
can be granted in a variety of ways besides through the 
provision of aid. Diplomatic support, military support and 
beneficial trade arrangements are three other types of 
rewards that have commonly been distributed. The provision 
of rewards by the PRC and the Soviet Union to Africa has 
been well documented since the late 1950"s.
In order to measure satisfactorily the influence 
attained, it is important to understand the level of 
influence, or, to use Russett"s term, the "scope of 
influence." He points out that "without carefully specifying 
what it is we want to obtain, the scope of influence, it is 
impossible to measure the amount of weight of 
influence."(21) If a specific goal is easily obtained and 
necessitates relatively little resource allocation, then its 
attainment is not a reliable means of gauging influence. For 
example, if the USSR wants to promote a certain vote in the 
UN General Assembly, and if Algeria feels inclined to
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support that vote also, then the Soviet Union could hardly 
be said to have exercised influence in this particular case. 
That which the USSR wanted, Algerian support on a particular 
vote, was easily attainable, and its attainment does not 
signal the presence of Soviet influence.
The importance of historical factors in terms of varying 
the possibility of gaining and maintaining influence is 
unquestioned. One such factor of great importance to Sino- 
Soviet influence in Africa is the continuation of strong 
ties between many African nations and the West. These ties 
preclude or minimize the ability of the Communist powers to 
gain or exercise influence in Africa. Both Great Britain and 
France maintain a residual influence on the continent. Their 
economic ties with Africa are such that they have retained 
the power to severely punish by cutting off essential aid, 
trade and services. While this power has been reduced since 
the 1960"s, it is still important. Neither China nor the 
USSR has been able to exert influence comparable to that of 
the West, and neither has possessed the power to punish 
African nations severely as have Great Britain and France.
African animosity towards perceived neo-colonialism and 
an affinity with the East that stems from a dislike of 
imperialism would seem to be factors that would promote the 
influence of the Communist powers. This has not proven to be 
the case. While some ideological agreement has occasionally 
been expressed, and bitterness towards the West seems to be
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everpresent, strong ties with the ex-colonial powers have 
continued.
In sum, Africa does not seem to be fertile ground for the 
growth of Chinese and Soviet influence, especially not on 
any grand scale. Levgold feels that "attempts to influence 
basic foreign policy orientations, domestic political 
transformations, or the status of third parties only promise 
failure." (22) The successes and failures both nations have 
experienced in Africa bear testimony to this statement. 
Rubinstein draws on the American experience in Vietnam to 
question the utility of expending resources through aid as a 
means of gaining influence. "Judging from the American 
experience, neither money nor its deprivation necessarily 
brings influence or benefits when these are most 
desired."(23) An important goal of both the Soviet and 
Chinese in Africa has been to gain diplomatic support. Over 
the past 20 years, their desire for support against the West 
has shifted to a desire for support against one another.
To identify influence, it is necessary to recognize the 
goals and rewards desired in return for resource 
allocations.The overriding goal of both Soviet and Chinese 
policy in Africa has been to gain diplomatic support. Over 
the past 20 years, their desire for support against the West 
has shifted to a desire for support against one another.
The difficulty of measuring influence may well rule out 
the possibility of establishing precise quantitative values
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for one nation"s influence over another. "Because of the 
multidimensionality of the concept, influence may more 
readily be inferred or identified than measured with any 
precision."(24) Nevertheless, various means of identifying 
influence do exist, some of which are more valuable than 
others.
To identify and assess the strength of influence, one 
must determine exactly what changes in the actual foreign 
policy or internal behavior of a state were a result of the 
exercising of influence by another state. It is necessary 
to isolate and enumerate instances and issues where 
influence has been applied. By analyzing such information, 
we can gain a concrete indication of the presence of 
influence in a particular relationship. For this purpose, it 
is imperative that we determine relatively effective 
indicators of influence. "These indicators will not be 
direct measurements of Soviet or Chinese influence itself; 
they are measurements which are presumed to correlate 
significantly with such influence. Ideally, they should 
indicate the likelihood that influence is present."(25) One 
such indicator that will be discussed at greater length is 
United Nations voting patterns.
Rubinstein enumerates a number of means of identifying 
the existence of influence. The most pertinent one to this 
thesis is the presence of a "sharp and sustained increase in 
the quantity, quality and variety of resources committed by
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to be."(26) The commitment of resources is a measure of 
influence as well as an indicator of influence, but it is
not actual influence. The importance of aid disbursements 
in terms of gaining political influence has often been 
overly emphasized, but there is little doubt that it has 
some effect. The question to be answered is how much 
influence, specifically demonstrated through diplomatic 
support, redounds from the provision of aid.
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There are a number of difficulties inherent in any 
attempt to collect empirical data that will substantiate the 
existence of a relationship between aid received and 
diplomatic support given. One of the most obvious of these 
is the possible unreliability of aid data, since neither the 
USSR nor the PRC publish aid figures. It is necessary to use 
US government intelligence reports, published by the State 
Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. While such 
publications are not perfect, they undoubtedly provide the 
best estimates available.(1) My confidence in using these 
figures is based on their use in other reputable studies.
This study by its very nature necessitates a high degree 
of subjectivity, especially when weighting various input 
variables. While such decisions may well be subject to 
criticism, justification will be offered. The unfortunate 
necessity for some degree of subjectivity stems from the 
variety of data that must be examined. While other authors 
have circumvented this difficulty by concentrating on more 
simplistic data analysis (2), I feel that it is necessary to 
gain the broadest possible perspective, and therefore have
PAGE 54
introduced a far wider range of variables. Weighting is 
necessary because some of these variables (for example, the 
provision of troops) are obviously of greater importance 
than others (for example, trade imports). As stated earlier, 
these subjective decisions will be justified later in this 
p aper.
Aid has often been seen as a political weapon, especially 
in its fullest context, incorporating the whole range of 
resource allocations into underdeveloped nations. "Although 
several objectives, including humanitarianism* are
attributed to the giving of foreign aid, use of foreign aid 
as an instrument of political influence for promoting 
national interest is considered one of the most important 
objectives by political leaders as well as by academic 
experts."(3) Morgenthau sees the provision of aid by the US 
as a crucial component of American foreign policy. For the 
United States has interests abroad which cannot be secured 
by military means and for the support of which the 
traditional methods of diplomacy are only in part 
appropriate. If foreign aid is not available they will not 
be supported at all."(4)
During the past decade* there have been a number of 
academic efforts directed at the possible existence of a 
relationship between "foreign aid" (generally in the more
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narrow sense of only economic aid) and UN voting. These 
efforts have, in my opinion, been lacking in certain areas, 
and have consequently been unable to find a definite and 
irrefutable correlation, or lack thereof, between these two 
variables.
Kul B. Rai's study focuses on US and Soviet aid to Third 
World nations. He hypothesizes that foreign aid is given 
either as an inducement to produce pro-donor voting, or it 
is given to reward those nations which have maintained a 
pro-donor voting stance. Some of the difficulties with Rai's 
study arise as a result of his use of all General Assembly 
roll call votes. "All the roll call votes taken in a
particular session (with the exception of unanimous votes) 
are included in the analysis and no attempt is made to 
identify those votes which may be considered important to 
the donors or the recipients of foreign aid."(5) Examination 
of a select number of votes, where the recipient nation is 
faced with two clear choices, would more readily indicate 
the provision of diplomatic support on issues where the 
nation's vote is actually tantamount to a declaration of 
support or opposition. By examining essentially all votes 
for a particular year, Rai confuses the issue and makes his 
results more difficult to interpret.
I will also take issue with Rai's consideration of only a 
limited number of variables as a representation of "foreign 
aid." He uses three measures of foreign aid to find the
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relationship between foreign aid and UN voting: "total
amount of aid received by a country from a donor in a 
certain year, per capita aid, and aid as a percentage of a 
recipient's total Gross Domestic Product."(6) These measures 
fail to incorporate certain aspects of economic aid which 
should be included. The provision of technicians and 
economic advisors, for example, is of great importance. In 
any case, while Rai's categories are helpful in accounting 
for economic aid, they neglect other important resource 
allocations that undoubtedly are relevant to the inducement 
of diplomatic support. Military aid, especially in the 
1970's, has become' increasingly important and must be 
considered. Trade in the African context, often on terms 
favorable to the African nations, must also be considered. 
In sum, Rai's analysis of resource input factors is far too 
narrow and limited and his findings may be a result of the 
simplicity of his conceptual scheme: "There is very little
relationship between total foreign aid and agreement index 
of the aid recipients with either of the superpowers."(7)
Eugene J. Alpert and Samuel Bernstein, in their several 
studies of the effects of aid on UN voting, focus on one 
issue, Communist China's admission into the United Nations. 
Their findings indicate that the provision of American aid 
was somewhat successful in gaining "no" votes in the General 
Assembly.
"A strong relationship between foreign aid and 
voting behavior clearly emerges on the admission 
issue. Countries that receive aid from both the
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United States and the USSR are more likely to 
vote in favor of the Soviet position, while most 
of those receiving no aid vote in opposition to 
the resolution.The results...show that these 
countries follow a set of rational decision 
rules by favoring voting with the nation that 
supplies it with foreign aid."(8)
A major difficulty with these studies by Alpert and
Bernstein is a result of their reliance on rather simplistic 
data. Aid either exists or does not exist, and no effort is 
made to differentiate between levels or amount of aid 
donated. This surely causes inconsistencies in the results
of such a study, for it implies that all levels of aid are 
equal and will therefore result in similar levels of 
diplomatic support. This assumption is false, for common 
sense dictates that, all other things being equal, nations 
which are heavily dependent on US aid will be much more 
likely to hold a pro-US position than nations that are not, 
regardless of the fact that both nations receive some 
quantity of American aid.
Alpert and Bernstein's results suffer from their decision 
not to take into account the different sizes of aid 
programs. Like Rai's study, these scholars do not consider
other types of aid. Also, by concentrating only on one
highly volatile issue, the applicability of their results to 
other issues becomes questionable. While Rai's study is too 
broad in its scope, focusing on practically all votes, 
Alpert and Bernstein's is too limited in this respect. 
Nevertheless, the authors conclude that "although we do not
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provide any statistical evidence of a causal relationship 
between foreign aid and UN voting, the associations revealed 
by the framework presented here tempt one to make the 
transition to a cause and effect explanation." (9)
The importance of employing a broad range of variables to 
account for resource allocations and thereby gain a better 
realization of the elements of influence can be seen from 
the inconclusive results of the above studies. The 
statistical base must be sufficiently broad to allow us to 
have the most realistic results. For this reason, my study 
will concentrate on thirty-two African nations and their 
comprehensive relations with both China and the Soviet 
Union. Similarities, in terms of the level of political and 
economic development, will be be one means of explaining 
similarities in levels of influence. Using a longitudinal 
study, I will be better able to correlate changes in "aid" 
(in the broader context) with levels of diplomatic support. 
By focusing on a limited variety of UN issues where the 
Sino-Soviet vote split, I will be better able to analyze 
voting patterns on a pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese basis.
The elements of influence to be examined consist of a 
variety of resources that China and/or the USSR have 
allocated to these African nations. I have divided these 
into three broad categories: economic aid, trade, and
military involvement. These in turn are broken down into a
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variety of components. By examining all three of these 
categories, my study is designed to measure more carefully 
the level of great power involvement than have other recent 
studies.
Economic aid involves the allocation of resources for
economic development in these African nations. This aid can
be in the form of concessionary loans, grants, gifts of
equipment and the services of technical advisors. Economic
aid has traditionally been seen as a political lever. All of
the major powers —  the US, the USSR, China, Great Britain
and France —  have provided substantial amounts of economic
aid to assist in Africa's development. The involvement of
the West European powers reflects the long period when they
essentially administered and exploited the continent.
According to John White, aid is often one result of a
colonial relationship.
"Not surprisingly, the countries which receive 
most aid, in relation to the size of the pop­
ulation, are those which have had in the past, 
and perhaps still have, a special relationship 
with some particular rich country, as a colon­
ial dependency..." (10)
Trade ties are probably less important in the context of 
great power influence in Africa, because African nations are 
limited in their absorptive capacity, and although some 
development and export of raw materials has occurred, 
exports to the communist powers have been limited in both 
size and importance. However, both exports and imports can 
serve to gain some level of influence for China and the
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Soviet Union. Exports from Africa are accepted in China and 
the USSR as a means of strengthening ties and establishing 
some measure of influence. Sometimes trade arrangements are 
really a form of subsidies, as higher prices are paid for 
goods than what can be had on the open market. By serving as 
a market for a limited number of African goods, China and 
the USSR heighten whatever level of economic reliance may 
exist. In much the same fashion, the import of goods into 
African nations serves to bind these countries to the USSR 
and China. Admittedly, such a relationship can, and has 
been, easily broken. But if, for example, the USSR provides 
800 tractors to Nigeria, then Nigeria will presumably need 
spare parts and maintenance equipment. The potential 
establishment of some level of dependency is clear. While 
trade ties are obviously of less importance than the other 
two categories of elements of influence, they still must be 
included in this study.
The third, and most important, element of influence is 
military involvement. This has especially proven to be the 
case in the 1970's, as military aid has tended to exceed 
economic aid. Morgenthau sees military aid as being more 
purely political in its aims, for it "obligates the 
recipient towards the giver. The latter expects the former 
to abstain from a political course which might put in 
jeopardy the continuation of military aid. Military aid is 
here in the nature of a bribe." (11)
PAGE 61
While military involvement in African nations may to some 
extent reflect a desire to gain strategic goals, it seems to 
have also been translated into a relationship of influence 
for the communist powers. African nations to whom military 
support is vital are obviously indebted to the donor nation, 
and the relationship is stronger than those that exist as a 
result of trade ties or purely economic aid. The various 
components of military involvement are discussed below.
In order to formulate a fairly comprehensive rating 
system for one nation's resource allocations to another, it 
is necessary in each case to examine several "sub-elements” 
of the three major groupings: economic aid, trade ties, and
military involvement. First, these sub-elements must each be 
ranked on a scale of zero to ten. (For example, in 1977 a 
score of nine or ten would be granted to Ethiopia for the 
Soviet sub-element "troops provided," because of the large 
numbers of Cuban troops in Ethiopia at that time.) They must 
then be weighted by multiplying each by a set coefficient. 
Then, by summing all the individual numerical scores (which 
will all be between zero and ten) after they have been 
multiplied by the proper coefficient, we will have a single 
score that can be used to rank that particular nation among 
its peers in terms of the receipt of Soviet or Chinese 
resources.
The most important major input category is military 
involvement. Alpert and Bernstein imply that military
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expenditures are perhaps the decisive factors in gaining 
influence.(12) Its sub-elements are: a) arms transfers
(score multiplied by a coefficient of 1.0); b); the
provision of military advisors (.5); and c) the provision of 
combat troops to perform combat duties (1.5). Each ranking 
is first determined on a scale of zero to ten and then 
multiplied by the proper coefficient. A score of zero 
represents no involvement while ten represents the greatest 
involvement that occured in that year. The coefficients, 
which afford us with our system of weighting, are determined 
on a subjective basis, justified by common sense.
The provision of combat troops is quite obviously the 
most important single means of gaining influence. This is 
especially true in a case where the contingent is large 
and/or serves a crucial security function. For this reason, 
it has received the highest coefficient, 1.5. The provision 
of troops is also probably the most difficult commitment for 
a great power to make, even with the "leasing" of Cuban 
troops.
Arms transfers have been of considerable importance as a 
means of attempting to gain influence in Africa, especially 
for the Soviet Union. Large amounts of weaponry of 
differing levels of sophistication and cost have been sent 
to Africa. Such tranfers have occurred with far greater 
regularity than has the provision of troops. Arms transfers 
represent a means of attempting to increase influence that
PAGE 63
is not as dangerous politically as providing troops. Arms 
transfers have been assigned a coefficient of 1.0.
The provision of advisors is of less significance than 
either the provision of troops or arms transfers. Advisors 
represent a less expensive investment and are more 
acceptable in a political sense than are combat troops. The
provision of advisors is the simplest means for a great
power to become involved militarily with a Third World
nation, and this is recognized by these nations. Advisors 
have been expelled from Third World nations time and again. 
The function they perform is often realized to be less than 
essential to the recipient nation. For that reason, I have 
assigned this sub-category, the provision of military
advisors, a coefficient of .5.
To ascertain a "score" for the communist powers' military 
involvement in a particular nation, one must only multiply 
each of the three individual scores by its proper 
coefficient and then add the results. The sum of the 
coefficients will be 3.0, compared to 1.0 for trade and 2.5 
for economic aid. Thus the relatively greater importance of 
military involvment will be reflected in the total input 
score.
A second major element of influence, trade, is of 
considerably less importance than military involvement. 
Trade relationships with the USSR and China have rarely been 
strong, and economic ties with the West have remained very
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close. Imports from the communist nations are probably 
slightly more important than exports to them. The PRC and 
the Soviet Union in some cases provide goods and services 
that may be very important to the individual economies of 
these nations. The provision of essential goods and 
services is very important to these developing nations. 
Influence derived from exports would result from agreements 
through which the USSR or China purchases commodities at 
higher than market prices at which the African nation would 
not have been able to unload them otherwise. An extreme 
example, and one that is not matched in Africa, is Cuba's 
sugar exports to the Soviet Union. A ranking will be 
established from the percentage of imports and exports that 
are from/to China and Russia and this will be multiplied by 
the coefficients .6 and .4, respectively.
Economic aid has been of central importance in the past 
in terms of gaining influence, primarily because of the 
desperate economic straits in which these nations generally 
find themselves. In the 1970's, it appears that a greater 
emphasis has been placed on military involvement. With the 
notable exception of the PRC, the major powers have all 
curtailed their economic aid programs to Africa. In any 
case, I will use several different measures of economic aid 
to ascertain its value. The first measure is the total 
dollar value of aid provided in a given year, and the second 
is per capita economic aid. The third and fourth measures 
are aid as percentage of Gross National Product per capita
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and economic advisors. The advantage of having a large 
number of measures is that different levels of aid become 
more readily apparent. Also, a large number of factors is 
helpful in reducing whatever small error may result from a 
subjective weighting system.
Of these four factors of economic aid, the total dollar 
value of the aid seems to be the single most important, 
largely because of the propaganda value associated with aid 
disbursments. The other three factors are largely concerned 
with the impact of the aid and its actual importance to a 
particular nation's economy. Each of the three has been 
assigned a coefficient of .5. Significantly, these three 
combined are more important than the dollar-value sub­
element (1.5 to 1.0). This reflects the fact that the 
greatest significance of aid in terms of influence is its 
importance to the economy. These three sub-elements more 
nearly measure the real importance of the aid given to the 
recipient nation.
Thus we have a formula, although admittedly imperfect, to 
measure each of the major elements of influence individually 
as well as a means of gaining a numerical value for the 
total involvement of either of the two communist powers in 
any one of thirty-two nations in any given year. Although 
perhaps incomplete, this scheme is a great deal more 
comprehensive than most. In any case, for a final annual 
resource input score, the formula that I have devised is as
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follows:
X=AT(1.0)+PT(1.5)+Ad(.5)+Im(.6)+Ex(.4)-ffic(l.0)+PC(.5)+PGC(.5)4EA(.5). 
These variables represent the individual scores compiled for 
the following: AT=arms transfers, PT=provision of troops,
Ad=advisors, Im=imports from, Ex=exports to, Ec=economic 
aid, PC=per capita economic aid, PGC=aid per GNP per capita 
and EA=economic advisors.
After the first stage of this study, each nation has 
received two comprehensive scores for each year, one for 
Soviet involvement and one for Chinese involvement. These 
calculations have produced the independent variable.
The next stage of this study involves the examination of 
UN voting, also on an annual basis. Once again, two tables 
will be necessary for each year, one for voting agreement 
with the USSR on issues where the Sino-Soviet vote differs, 
the other for voting agreement with the PRC on these issues.
It is important to note that the only issues examined will 
be those where the Chinese and Soviet votes differed. This 
allows us to view an African nation's votes in terms of 
either a pro-Soviet or a pro-Chinese position as well as 
making it possible to establish an annual voting support 
score, based on the voting support given on each issue, for 
both China and the USSR.
For this purpose, it is necessary to quantify carefully 
the support given on a particular issue. Each issue will be
worth ten points total, and the level of support will
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therefore be on a ten point scale. All issue scores for a 
particular year can then be summed and divided by the number 
of issues to provide a score of voting agreement for that 
year. To get an annual numerical value for voting support, 
we will take the average score for that year for each 
relationship. Each African nation will, therefore, again 
have two scores: one for diplomatic support for the USSR,
the other for the PRC. Necessarily, these two scores will
together equal 10.00, for support given one of these
countries is taken away from the other since we are only 
examining issues in which the two differed in their 
position. Each nation's deviation from the mean can then be 
computed to allow us to see which nations had higher indices 
of agreement with China or the Soviet Union.
One last point of some potential consequence involves my 
treatment of absences and abstentions. I have determined 
that an absence from a roll call vote will in practice be 
considered a no vote. An absence would therefore reduce a 
nation's number of votes on a particular issue. An
abstention, however, indicates that a nation, while not 
desiring to support an issue, has no desire to oppose it 
either. An abstention, therefore, will be considered as half 
of a vote each way. If a particular issue is only voted on 
once, and an abstention results, the issue scores would 
necessarily be 5 and 5 for the nation that abstained.
Formation of a composite annual score for voting support
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for both the USSR and the PRC completed the second stage of 
this project. The third and final stage involves comparing 
each nation's two annual resource allocation scores with the 
deviation from the mean of their two annual voting support 
scores. Relationships should be observable. Input scores 
should correlate roughly with voting scores.
Finally, this comparison may produce some results where, 
for example, diplomatic support relative to input is far 
below the mean. Some results may not fit the general
i
pattern, and it may be necessary to examine these more 
closely in order to explain these differences by preparing a 
short case study.
In conclusion, this study is not expected to provide 
final proof in the continuing debate about the relationship 
between UN voting and the provision of aid. However, it will 
serve a useful function as it more carefully and completely 
prescribes the elements of aid. In essence, this study is 
more broadly based and more comprehensive than that done by 
Rai, but it does not suffer from the use of generalities as 
do those by Alpert and Bernstein. My results will presumably 
be more conclusive than theirs have been.
The People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, 
active competitors for diplomatic support in Africa, have 
extended numerous resources to nations of that continent. 
Have such commitments been successful in generating
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diplomatic support? The answer should become clear in the 
following pages.
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Chapter Five 
Results of 
Quantitative Research
For several reasons, a number of nations were excluded 
from the statistical survey of Sino-Soviet resource
allocations to sub-Saharan Africa during the 1974-78 period.
I had to exclude Angola because of a lack of trade
statistics and also because of its later entry into the
United Nations. Botswana was excluded largely because of its 
great dependency on South Africa, which may well affect its 
relations with the communist powers. Guinea and Equatorial 
Guinea had to be removed from quantitative consideration 
because of highly questionable trade statistics.
My quantitative research revealed significant levels of 
Soviet and Chinese resource allocations to the sub-Saharan 
region of Africa. However, these resource inputs did not 
necessarily affect the African nation's General Assembly 
voting on issues contested between the Soviet Union and 
China. A regression analysis indicated that there is an 
extremely low correlation between material relationships and 
United Nation's voting in this case. The data from my 
research is presented in an appendix.
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Despite the lack of correlation, there are a few nations 
that consistently displayed above-average support for one of 
the communist power's positions. Zambia is a case in point. 
The Zambian voting index of agreement with the PRG is 
consistently higher than the average. While this may be a 
reflection of similar viewpoints, it should be pointed out 
that Zambia and China maintained excellent diplomatic and 
economic relations during this period. The most consistent 
supporter of the Soviet position was Rwanda, although 
relations between the two nations appear to have been 
limi ted.
Somalia provides an interesting case which may indicate 
that voting support stems not from resource inputs but 
rather from the status of bilateral relations. Somalia voted 
largely in support of the Soviet position from 1974 to 1976. 
But as relations deteriorated in 1977, Somalia began to 
adopt a less pro-Soviet voting stance. This pattern 
continued into 1978, and has been fully described in Chapter 
Two.
It seems best to review each year of the five year period 
to gain a better perspective on Chinese and Soviet resource 
allocations to the region. Because of the significantly low 
correlation these allocations have with voting, I will 
refrain from discussing the voting support scores and will 
concentrate on economic and military contacts only. 
Principal sources for trade and aid statistics were,
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respectively, the UN Yearbook of International Trade and the 
CIA publications on Communist activities in the Third World. 
The SIPRI Disarmament Yearbooks were my principal source of 
information on arms transfers and military involvement. 
These publications are generally considered reliable and 
have often been used in similar studies. A full tabulation 
of the various allocation and voting scores can be found in 
an appendix.
Soviet and Chinese involvement in sub-Saharan Africa in 
1974 was limited in comparison to later years of the period 
under study, but both nations committed an impressive level 
of resources to the region. While there were no Cuban troops 
in Africa at the time, the Soviet Union provided advisors to 
a number of countries, as did the Chinese. The USSR made 
large deliveries of arms to Somalia, Uganda, and newly- 
independent Guinea-Bissau. For the most part, these 
deliveries consisted of jet fighters (MIG-17's and MIG-21's) 
although Somalia also received SA-2 surface-to-air missiles 
and 100 T-54 tanks. Chinese arms transfers to the region
were limited to nine MIG-17's for Sudan and eight MIG-19's 
for Tanzania.
In terms of economic aid, Chinese commitments were far 
larger than those of the USSR. The principal recipients of 
Chinese aid were Mauritania ($57 m.), Niger ($50 m.),
Tanzania ($75 m.) and Zambia ($51m.). In contrast, the most 
important recipient of Soviet economic aid was Mali ($12
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m.). No other Soviet beneficiary was given more than $2 
million.
In terms of trading relationships, China was also more 
important in the region. China was an important trading 
partner for a number of African nations, including Benin 
(11% of exports), Gambia (10% of imports), Madagascar (11% 
of imports), Mali (9% of imports and 17% of exports), Sudan 
(9% and 8%) and Tanzania (12% of imports). In addition, 
China had economic relations with a larger number of African 
nations than did the USSR.
The Soviet Union was an important economic partner for 
Guinea only, and this was partially a reflection of that 
nation's exports of bauxite to the USSR. Guinea received 
approximately 15% of its imports from the Soviet Union while 
sending 6% of its exports to that nation. In no other 
African nation included in this study did the percentage of 
imports from and exports to combine to equal 10 or more.
As was often the case, 1974 was a year, in which Soviet 
military involvement in the region was far greater than that 
of the PRC. The Chinese, however, were far more involved in 
the region economically. In terms of trade and economic 
aid, the PRC easily outdistanced the USSR in 1974.
The next year, 1975, again witnessed large Soviet arms 
transfers to sub-Saharan Africa. Uganda received a large 
number and variety of Russian weapons, including MIG-21's,
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T-54 tanks, AT-Sagger anti-tank missiles and K-13 air-to-air 
missiles for the MiG's. Somalia received ship-to-ship 
missiles (SSN-2) and Nigeria acquired a squadron of MIG-21's 
equipped with K-13 missiles and an unknown quantity of older 
MIG-17's. In stark contrast, the PRC's military transfers to 
the region consisted of four "Shanghai” patrol boats, two 
each for Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea.
Chinese aid commitments fell off slightly but were still 
impressive. Principal recipients were Mozambique ($59 m.), 
Madagascar ($55 m.), Gambia and Guinea-Bissau (both 
receiving $17 m.). Soviet aid commitments were again
limited, with Somalia acquiring the lion's share ($63 m.) 
and Chad granted almost all of the remainder ($9 m.).
China also continued to maintain a more impressive 
trading record with sub-Saharan Africa. While of greatest 
importance to Mali (14% of imports, 18% of exports), the 
China trade was also significant for Gambia (12% of imports) 
and Tanzania (11% of imports). Soviet trade again focused on 
Guinea (17% of Guinean imports, 14% of exports), although 
newly-independent Guinea-Bissau established important 
economic ties (16% of imports) with the USSR. Cameroon 
increased its exports to the Soviet Union (11% of total) and 
Somalia too became increasingly involved (8% of imports, 6% 
of exports).
The following year, 1976, witnessed an enormous increase 
in the Soviet Union's military involvement in the region,
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while the PRC maintained its commitments at close to the 
same level as 1975. In addition to sending 500 military 
advisors to Angola and subsidizing an expeditionary force of 
some 10,000 Cuban troops, the USSR transferred 30 ancient 
T-34 tanks and eight more modern T-54's plus a large number 
of SA-7 surface-to-air missiles to the MPLA. As well as 
this major commitment to Angola, more than 100 T-34 and and 
T-54 tanks were sent to Mozambique. Nigeria received 12 more 
MIG-21's equiped with the K-13 system; Uganda acquired 12 
MIG-21's and Zambia purchased six MI-5 helicopters. In 
contrast, China made no significant arms deliveries to the 
region in 1976.
In terms of aid, the PRC continued to outshine the Soviet 
Union, although both nations limited their commitments 
significantly. Principal recipients of Chinese aid were 
Tanzania and Zambia ($28 m. each) as they acquired the final 
credits extended in connection with the Tanzam railway 
construction project. The most important recipients of 
Soviet economic aid were Guinea-Bissau ($13 m.) and Angola 
($10 m.). The third major ex-Portuguese colony, Mozambique, 
received a mere pittance in Soviet aid ($3 m.).
Chinese trade relations remained of importance to Gambia 
(13% of imports) and Mali (7% of imports, 10% of exports), 
despite a marked decline in trade with the latter. Of 
significance was an improving trade relationship with 
Somalia. Tanzanian (and Zambian) imports from China dropped
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precipitously, a result of the completion of the Tanzam 
railway. For the USSR, Guinea continued to be the closest 
thing to a dependency the region had to offer (23% of 
imports, 17% of exports). Ghana increased her exports to the 
USSR (11% of total) and Somalia's imports from the Soviet 
Union increased substantially (to 12% of total) as well.
In 1977, while Soviet military support for Angola was 
maintained at a high level, massive deliveries were also 
made to Ethiopia. Angola received 55 more aged T-34 tanks as 
well as SA-7 surface-to-air missile systems, and the Cuban 
presence was increased substantially to an estimated 19,000. 
A truly phenomenal package was sent to Ethiopia in reaction 
to Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden. Five hundred Soviet 
advisors and a few Cubans arrived in 1977, but most of the 
Cuban troops arrived in early 1978. Included in the weapons 
sent to Ethiopia were 24 MIG-21's, six MIG-23's, 50 T-54
tanks and 100 T-55's. These weapons systems were
unparalleled in the region in terms of their numbers and 
sophistication. To some extent, their operation required 
expertise that Ethiopian troops did not possess. Mozambique 
also was sent 12 MIG-21's. The PRC sent two patrol boats to 
Cameroon and 20 T-62 tanks to Zaire. This latter transfer is 
an indication of the development of closer relations between 
Zaire and the PRC in response to the perceived Soviet gains 
in southern Africa.
Chinese economic aid to the region decreased dramatically
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from 1976 to 1977. Liberia was the major recipient ($10 m.), 
but no other nation received a substantial commitment. The 
decrease in Chinese aid allowed the USSR to briefly take the 
lead. Of interest was a major commitment to Tanzania ($19 
m.), often considered to be China's greatest friend in the 
area. Angola and Mozambique also received Soviet economic 
aid ($6 m. and $5 m., respectively).
Both Chinese and Soviet trade to sub-Saharan Africa 
continued to be of relatively little importance to the 
region as a whole. Important relations with the PRC 
continued for Gambia (12% of imports) and Mali (5% of 
imports, 12% of exports). Tanzania continued to reduce its 
imports from China (to less than 2% of total). The Soviet 
Union continued to be an important trading partner for 
Guinea (20% of imports, 15% of exports), Ghana (10% of 
exports), and Somalia (12% of imports).
Soviet military deliveries to Angola and Ethiopia 
continued on a large scale in 1978. Angola received 2000 
SA-7 portable surface-to-air missiles that had been ordered 
in 1976. Ethiopia acquired an additional 25 T-54 tanks as
well as 30 of the newer T-70's. Both nations also retained 
large numbers of Soviet advisors as well as Cuban troops. In 
addition, the number of Soviet advisors in Mozambique was 
increased to more than 1000. China's military role in the 
region was limited to a small number of advisors in several 
countries, including Equatorial Guinea and Mozambique.
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Chinese aid commitments increased somewhat, but did not 
approach the levels of 1974-76. Somalia, no longer allied 
with the USSR, received a substantial amount ($18 m.) of 
Chinese aid, while Liberia received the largest amount ($23 
m.) for the second straight year. Liberia also received aid 
from the Soviet Union ($6 m.). In addition, the Russians 
sent significant amounts of aid to to Mozambique ($5 m.) and 
again to Tanzania ($18 m.)
The PRC become an important trading partner for 
Mozambique (22% of exports) in 1978. In addition, important 
trade relations were maintained between Gambia (10% of 
exports) and Mali (12% of exports) and the PRC. China also 
became a more important trading partner again for Somalia 
(6% of imports, 11% of exports). Soviet trade relations 
decreased slightly in 1978, but remained of importance to 
Guinea (figures not available) and Ghana (11% of exports). 
Somalia's trade relations with the USSR totally bottomed out 
in the wake of Barre's November 1977 expulsion of all Soviet 
advisors (.6% of imports, 0% of exports).
The period witnessed Soviet domination over the PRC in 
terms of military involvement in the region of sub-Saharan 
Africa. This is largely a reflection of each nation's 
capabilities. China does not have the ability, militarily or 
logistically, to act as the Soviet Union did in Angola or 
Ethiopia. For that matter, she may not desire to do so.
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In terms of economic aid, China's program was clearly of 
consistent superiority. More nations received more 
substantial amounts of Chinese aid. Although Chinese 
commitments seemed to be decreasing (as did those of the 
USSR), they continued to be qualitatively and quantitatively 
superior to those of the Soviet Union.
In terms of trade, neither the PRC nor the USSR are of
great importance to the region as a whole. Sub-Saharan
Africa continued to trade largely with the western
industrial nations, often with the ex-colonial powers. On a 
relative scale, however, Chinese trade seemed to be somewhat 
more important to these nations than did that of the USSR. 
Consistently throughout this period, China was an important 
trading partner for Gambia and Mali. The Soviet Union was of 
greatest importance in this respect for Guinea.
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Chapter Six 
Conclusions
This study has been conclusive in a number of ways. It 
has demonstrated that either 1) voting agreement is not an 
accurate indicator of influence, or 2) neither the Soviet 
Union nor China have gained much influence despite major 
resource allocations to sub-Saharan Africa. My assumption is 
that China and the Soviet Union do possess influence in 
Africa, although that influence is not only a result of the 
three types of resources allocated. A number of less 
tangible factors, discussed at greater length in Chapter 
Three, are also of importance in this regard.
The implication is that the index of voting agreement is 
not an accurate means of establishing the presence of 
influence. There are several reasons for this. First of all, 
the resolutions voted on during the period in question were 
not of intense significance to either the USSR or the PRC, 
and it seems doubtful that Moscow or Peking would have 
applied much pressure in an attempt to gain votes for their 
respective positions. Second, most of the thirty-two 
nations, regardless of their relations with the communist 
powers, would probably vote according to their own national 
interest. The national interest in such cases often does not
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correspond to that of China or Russia. The level of 
dependency necessary to make one country's national interest 
coincide with another's must indeed be high. Sovereign 
nations vote independently of one another, and it seems 
questionable whether Moscow or Peking would normally expect 
extensive support from their aid recipients in the General 
Assembly.
On a particular issue of far greater significance than 
those debated during the 1974-78 period, the results may 
well be more positive. This is why Alpert and Bernstein's 
study is so interesting. The single issue under recurring 
discussion —  the admission of the PRC to the UN -—  had a 
number of important political ramifications (for instance, 
the expulsion of Chiang's Republic of China) and it was 
therefore the focus of far more intense political pressure. 
Under such circumstances, it seems logical to assume that 
nations that possessed the capability would be much more 
likely to exert their influence. Significantly, Alpert and 
Bernstein did find a correlation between US aid and votes 
against China's admission in the 1960's. That correlation 
was gradually reduced as nations came to realize the 
stupidity of keeping a nation comprising one quarter of the 
world's population out of the United Nations.
The three elements which combined to make up the quantity 
"resource inputs" —  military involvement, economic aid and 
trade —  all serve to some extent as a potential basis of
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influence. Influence does not truly exist unless pressure is 
applied to cause or change an action. By itself, a high 
level of resource allocation is not an indication of 
influence, although it can be a partial indicator of 
potential influence. Influence is only brought to bear when 
a request is made, with the inference being that non- 
acquiesence will result in some unpleasant manipulation of 
the bases of potential influence. This however is influence 
in its most negative sense. Because of the many difficulties 
involved, quantitative studies cannot concern themselves 
with the type of influence that stems from admiration and 
respect. In any case, diplomatic decisions are not often 
based on emotion.
The difficulty of measuring influence continues to be a 
problem. Without extensive insights into the political 
decision-making process of a given country, it would seem 
be very difficult to accurately gauge what influences 
decision-makers feel they must satisfy. Alvin Z. Rubinstein 
makes this point and says that to gain an accurate estimate 
of the influence generated by aid, "we need to trace the aid 
into the political system and see its relevance for (the 
country's) domestic political conflicts and outcomes."(1) In 
other words, the importance of Soviet or Chinese involvement 
to a particular nation is not necessarily a function of the 
level of involvement but is related to its impact on the 
decision-making leaders or process in that country. "Instead 
of analyzing aggregate data on aid and trade, we need to
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know into which ministries and sectors of the economy the 
aid is channeled, how it affects not the economy but the 
political position of the ruling elite..."(2) What 
Rubinstein suggests is quite a difficult task. While the 
value of such a study is unquestioned, the impracticality of 
actually conducting it seems to have dissuaded the 
profession from such attempts.
If aggregate data analysis is not sufficient to measure 
influence, and neither is General Assembly voting, what 
realistic options remain for the researcher? Precious few, 
it would seem. Influence, because of the large number of 
intangible factors involved in the concept, may be 
impossible to quantify. Rubinstein's idea, involving 
penetration of the upper levels of a bureaucracy, seems more 
suited to an intelligence operation than to an academic 
effort.
By concluding that influence as a concept is intangible, 
the idea of realistically measuring it seems to be
precluded. Perhaps an amalgamation involving data 
accumulation, personal interviews (polls of ministry
officials), and the solicitation of a variety of expert 
viewpoints would serve to provide a more realistic "measure" 
of influence, but this is questionable. As seen time and
again, "expert" opinions often vary widely. In any case,
such a massive project would be most difficult to undertake. 
The "measurement" of influence, I fear, will continue to be
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largely a misnomer.
Africa has been an important ideological battlefield for
the Sino-Soviet rivalry since its outward manifestations
began in the early 1960's. Both nations have sought to gain
some measure of political support in Africa. Colin Legum, in
an article entitled "The Soviet Union, China and the West in
Southern Africa," contends that China's approach has
generally been more successful than that of the USSR:
"The Chinese profited more quickly from 
their mistakes than did the Russians... 
avoiding blatant bids for political 
domination, and tailoring their programs 
to meet the particular requests of the 
Africans themselves, they imparted a 
sense of both generosity and 
disinterest to their aid role which has 
led to their steadily widening their 
sphere of influence on the African 
continent."(3)
To a large extent, both nations have been unsuccessful in 
their quest for support, for most African nations desire to 
maintain a nonaligned stance regarding this dispute as well 
as the East-West struggle. Firm commitments of political 
support are rare and often do not last for very long.
Although China and the Soviet Union have at times enjoyed 
very close relations with individual African states, their 
position is fundamentally weaker than that of the Western 
ex-colonial powers. Although Africa may identify more 
closely with the USSR and the PRC in an ideological sense, 
material necessities virtually demand continued close ties
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with the West. This fact is a reflection of these nations' 
colonial heritage as well as the West's greater ability to 
provide technological and development assistance. In sum, 
while China and the Soviet Union may find a degree of 
compatability with African nations on an anti-imperialist 
basis, African nations will largely refrain from extensive 
economic ties with the communist powers. In the realm of 
military procurements, however, the Soviet Union will 
continue to have many customers as long as its prices and 
terms of sale compete effectively with those of the West.
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1) Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet and Chinese Influence in the 
Third World. (New York, NY.: Praeger, 1975), page 15.
2) Ibid.
3) Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in 
Southern Africa," Foreign Affairs Vol. 54, No. 4 (July 
1976), page 748.
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APPENDIX
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Involvement and Voting Scores
Abbreviations for Scores:
MI = military involvement
TR = trade
Aid = economic aid
Tot = total
Vote = voting
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1974
PRC USSR
Country MI TR Aid Tot Vote MI TR Aid Tot Vote
Benin 0 4.3 0 4.3 0 0 0.6 0 0.6 10.0
Burundi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.0
Cameroon 0 1.3 0 1.3 0 0 0.8 0 0.8 10.0
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 8.3
Chad 0 0 0 0 1.4 0 0 0 0 8.6
Congo 0 1.5 0 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 10.0
Ethiopia 0 1.2 0 1.2 0 0 1.2 0.1 1.3 10.0
Gabon 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 8.3
Gambia 0 5.2 0 5.2 8.6 0 0.6 0 0.6 1.4
Ghana 0 2.4 0 2.4 1.7 0 3.4 0 3.4 8.3
Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0 0 --- 4.5 0 0 4.5 ----
Ivory Coast 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 0 1.1 10.0
Kenya 0 0.8 0 0.8 0 0 0.8 0 0.8 10.0
Liberia 0 1.0 0 1.0 3.3 0 0.3 0 0.3 6.7
Madagascar 0 5.5 0 5.5 0.8 0 0.2 0 0.2 9.2
Malawi 0 0 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 7.5
Mali 0 8.5 0 8.5 0.6 0 4.0 3.6 7.6 9,4
Mauritania 0 1.0 15.3 16.3 0 0 0 0 0 10.0
Mozambique — --- --- --- --- — --- --- --- ----
Niger 0 1.0 12.6 13.6 2.2 0 0 0.1 0.1 7.8
Nigeria 0 1.0 0 1.0 3.3 0 0.8 0 0.8 6.7
Rwanda 0 2.1 0 2.1 0 0 0.8 0 0.8 10.0
Senegal 0 1.6 0 1.6 0.6 0 2.6 0.1 2.7 9.4
Sierra Leone 0 2.7 0 2.7 4.4 0 0.4 0 0.4 5.6
Somalia 0 4.2 0 4.2 0 12.5 3.2 0.1 15.8 10.0
Sudan 3.0 6.4 0 9.4 0.8 2.0 0.9 0 2.9 9.2
Tanzania 5.0 6.5 15.5 27.0 1.7 0 0.6 0 0.6 8.3
Togo 0 2.4 0 2.4 0 0 1.0 0 1.0 10.0
Uganda 0 1.5 0 1.5 1.1 4.0 1.2 0 5.2 8.9
Upper Volta 0 0.3 0 0.3 0.8 0 0 0 0 9.2
Zaire 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 10.0
Zambia 0 3.0 0 3.0 2.8 0 0.2 0 0.2 7.2
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1975
PRC
Country MI TR Aid Tot
Benin 0 2.8 0 2.8
Burundi 0 0.2 0 0.2
Cameroon 1.0 0.4 0 1.4
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0 0 . 0 0
Chad 0 0 0 0
Congo 0 1.3 0 1.3
Ethiopia 0 0.7 0 0.7
Gabon 0 0.4 0 0.4
Gambia 0 4.2 9.7 13.9
Ghana 0 1.1 0 1.1
Guinea-B i s s au 0 0.8 7.8 8.6
Ivory Coast 0 0 0 0
Kenya 0 0.3 0 0.3
Liberia 0 0.6 0 0.6
Madagascar 0 1.2 14.1 15.3
Malawi 0 0 0 0
Mali 0 9.1 • 0.8 9.9
Mauritania 0 1.6 15.2 16.8
Mozambique 0 0 0 0
Niger 0 0.7 0 0.7
Nigeria 0 0.4 0 0.4
Rwanda 0 1.7 0 1.7
Senegal 0 0.4 0 0.4
Sierra Leone 0 0.4 0 0.4
Somalia 0 2.9 0 2.9
Sudan 0 3.5 0 3.5
Tanzania 0 5.0 0 5.0
Togo 0 1.3 0 1.3
Uganda 0 1.8 0 1.8
Upper Volta 0 0.6 0 0.6
Zaire 0 0.2 0 0.2
Zambia 0 1.7 0 1.7
USSR
Vote MI TR Aid Tot Vote
2.5 0 0.7 0 0 7.5
3.1 0 0 0 0 6.9
1.3 0 2.6 0 0 8.7
3.8 0 0 0 0 6.2
2.2 0 0 3.8 3,8 7.8
3.8 0 0 0 0 6.2
2.5 0 0.7 0.8 1.5 7.5
3.4 0 0 0 0 6.6
1.3 0 0.2 0 0.2 8.7
0.3 0 2.1 0 2.1 8.7
0.6 0 6.0 0.2 6.2 9.4
1.3 0 1.0 0 1.0 8.7
1.9 0 0.5 0 0.5 8.1
1.3 0 0.1 0 0.1 8.7
1.3 0 0 0 0 8.7
3.4 0 0 0 0 6.6
1.9 0 1.0 0 1.0 8.1
1.3 0 0 0 0 8.7
--- 0 0.2 0 0.2 ----
1.3 0 0.5 0 0.5 8.7
1.3 6.0 0.5 0 6.5 8.7
1.3 0 1.1 0 1.1 8.7
1.3 0 1.1 0 1.1 8.7
2.5 0 0.4 0 0.4 7.5
1.3 4.5 3.7 14.8 23.0 8.7
1.3 0 0.8 0 0.8 8.7
1.3 0 0.5 0 0.5 8.7
3.8 0 0.8 0 0.8 6.2
1.3 10.0 1.8 0 11.8 8.7
2.5 0 0.6 0 0.6 7.5
1.3 0 0.6 0 0.6 8.7
3.1 0 0.1 0 0.1 6.9
Table 3 PAGE 92
1976
PRC USSR
Country MI TR Aid Tot Vote MI TR Aid Tot
Benin 0 1.8 0 1.8 3.3 0 0.7 0 0.7
Burundi 0 0.3 0 0.3 1.8 0 0.1 0 0.1
Cameroon 0 1.4 0 1.4 3.0 0 3.0 0 3.0
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0 0 7.4 7.4 5.8 0 0 0 0
Chad 0 0.1 0 0.1 2.5 0 0 0 0
Congo 0 1.4 0 1.4 2.8 0 0 0 0
Ethiopia 0 1.1 1.3 2.4 2.5 0 0.9 0.1 1.0
Gabon 0 0.7 0 0.7 3.8 0 0 0 0
Gambia 0 6.0 0 6.0 4.5 0 0.4 0 0.4
Ghana 0 1.2 0.1 1.3 2.8 0 4.2 0.3 4.5
Guinea-Bissau 0 3.4 0 3.4 2.0 0.5 1.4 12.4 14.3
Ivory Coast 0 0 0 0 2.5 0 0.9 0 0.9
Kenya 0 0.4 0 0.4 3.3 0 0.7 0 0.7
Liberia 0 0.1 0 0.1 6.0 0 0.2 0 0.2
Madagascar 0 1.7 0 1.7 2.5 0 0.8 0 0.8
Malawi 0 0 0 0 6.5 0 0 0 0
Mali 0 7.3 0.3 7.6 2.0 0 1.7 0.3 2.0
Mauritania 0 0 0.2 0.2 4.0 0 0.5 0 0.5
Mozambique 0.5 0 0 0.5 5.3 12.0 0 1.6 13.6
Niger 0 1.4 0 1.4 2.0 0 0 0 0
Nigeria 0 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.5 8.0 0.2 0.1 8.3
Rwanda 0 1.8 0 1.8 2.5 0 1.0 0 1.0
Senegal 0 1.1 0 1.1 2.5 0 0 0 0
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 0 4.3 0 1.0 0 1.0
Somalia 0 4.3 1.8 6.1 3.0 5.0 7.1 1.3 13.4
Sudan 0 2.9 0 2.9 2.5 0.5 2.9 0 3.4
Tanzania 0 4.2 16.2 20.4 2.0 0 0.6 0.1 0.7
Togo 0 1.5 0 1.5 3.0 0 1.4 0 1.4
Uganda 0 0.7 0.1 0.8 3.3 8.5 1.0 0.1 9.6
Upper Volta 0 1.3 0 1.3 2.0 0 0 0 0
Zaire 0 0 0 0 3.5 0 0 0 0
Zambia 0 1.9 19.0 20.9 2.0 4.0 0.3 0.2 4.5
Vote
6.7 
8.2
7.0
4.2
7.5
7.2
7.5
6.2
5.5 
7.2
8.0
7.5
6.7
4.0
7.5
3.5
8.0 
6.0
4.7 
8.0
9.5
7.5
7.5
5.7
7.0
7.5
8.0
7.0
6.7
8.0
6.5 
8.0
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1977
PRC USSR
Country MI TR Aid Tot Vote MI TR Aid Tot Vote
Benin 0 0.7 0 0,7 3.5 0 0 0 0 6.5
Burundi 0 2.6 0 2.6 1.0 0 0.2 0 0.2 9.0
Cameroon 1.0 0.8 0 1.8 2.0 0 1.4 0 1.4 8.0
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 0 0 0 6.7
Chad 0 1.0 0 1.0 2.0 0 0 0 0 8.0
Congo 0 0.6 0 0.6 3.0 0 0 0 0 7.0
Ethiopia 0 1.7 0.3 2.0 1.0 15.3 1.2 0.7 17.2 9.0
Gabon 0 0 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 7.5
Gambia 0 5.9 0 5.9 4.0 0 0 0 0 6.0
Ghana 0 1.4 0.1 1.5 2.0 0 4.5 0.7 5.2 8.0
Guinea-Bissau 0 0.9 0 0.9 2.0 2.0 1.8 0 3.8 8.0
Ivory Coast 0 0 0 0 2.5 0 0.4 0 0.4 7.5
Kenya 0 0.7 0 0.7 2.5 0 0.6 0 0.6 7.5
Liberia 0 1.7 12.1 13.8 3.3 0 0 0 0 6.7
Madagascar 0 2.4 0 2.4 3.5 0 1.5 0 1.5 6.5
Malawi 0 0 0 0 4.0 0 0 0 0 6.0
Mali 0 6.2 0.5 6.7 0.8 1.8 1.8 0.4 4.0 9.2
Mauritania 0 0.3 0 0.3 2.2 0 0.1 0 0.1 7.8
Mozambique 1.0 0.5 0.1 1.6 2.5 2.3 0 5,3 7.6 7.5
Niger 0 1.0 0 1.0 1.5 0 0 0 0 8.5
Nigeria 0 0.7 0 0.7 3.0 0 0 0 0 7.0
Rwanda 0 2.5 0 2.5 1.0 0 0.6 0 0.6 9.0
Senegal 0 0.8 0 0.8 1.0 0 0 0 0 9.0
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 7.5
Somalia 0 3.4 3.0 6.4 4.3 0 6.1 1.1 7.2 5.7
Sudan 0 4.1 1.0 5.1 2.0 0 2.3 0.1 2.4 8.0
Tanzania 0 1.8 1.0 2.8 2.5 0 0.6 11.2 11.8 7.5
Togo 0 1.2 0 1.2 2.0 0 1.5 0 1.5 8.0
Uganda 0 0.2 0 0.2 4.5 0 0 0.1 0.1 5.5
Upper Volta 0 1.6 0 1.6 1.0 0 0 0 0 9.0
Zaire 2.0 0 0 2.0 2.0 0 0 0 0 8.0
Zambia 0 1.7 2.5 4.2 3.8 0 0 0.1 0.1 6.2
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Benin 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 0.2 0 0.2
Burundi 0 3.8 0 3.8 2.2 0 0.4 0 0.4
Cameroon 0 2.1 0 2.1 2.2 0 2.5 0 2.5
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0 0.1 0 0.1 3.1 0 0.1 2.2 2.3
Chad 0 1.6 0 1.6 2.8 0 0 0 0
Congo 0 1.5 0 1.5 0.6 1.0 0.4 0 1.4
Ethiopia 0 2.6 0.1 2.7 2.2 17.5 0.9 0.5 18.9
Gabon 0 0 0 0 2.2 0 0 2.0 2.0
Gambia 0 6.0 0 6.0 1.4 0 0.4 0 0.4
Ghana 0 1.6 0.1 1.7 2.2 0 4.7 0.1 4.8
Guinea-Bissau 0 1.1 0 1.1 2.2 0 6.0 0.2 6.2
Ivory Coast 0 0 0 0 2.8 0 1.0 0 1.0
Kenya 0 0.6 0 0.6 2.2 0 0.7 0 0.7
Liberia 0 2.4 18.5 20.9 2.8 0 0.4 4.3 4.7
Madagas car 0 5.0 0.1 5.1 5.6 0 0.7 0 0.7
Malawi 0 0 0 0 5.6 1.0 0 0 1.0
Mali 0 2.3 0.2 2.5 2.2 0 2.8 1.0 3.8
Mauritania 0 0 0.2 0.2 4.7 0 1.1 0.1 1.2
Mozambique 0 4.0 0.1 4.1 2.2 5.0 0 3.7 8.7
Niger 0 1.4 0.1 1.5 2.2 0 0 0 0
Nigeria 0 1.1 0.1 1.2 2.2 0 2.4 0.7 3.1
Rwanda 0 4.1 0 4.1 2.2 0 1.6 0 1.6
Senegal 0 2.1 0.1 2.3 2.2 0 0 0.1 0.1
Sierra Leone 0 2.0 0 2.0 2.2 0 0 0 0
Somalia 0 2.5 15.0 17.5 3.6 0 0.4 0 0.4
Sudan 0 6.2 0.4 6.6 2.2 0 0.8 0.1 0.9
Tanzania 0 3.0 0.5 3.5 3.3 4.0 0.9 15.5 20.4
Togo 0 1.8 0 1.8 2.2 0 0.8 0 0.8
Uganda 0 0 0 0 3.3 0 0 0 0
Upper Volta 0 2.3 0 2.3 2.2 0 0 0 0
Zaire 0 0 0 0 2.2 0 0 0 0
Zambia 0 1.5
CO•CM 4.3 3.3 0 0 0.1 0.1
Vote
6.7
7.8
7.8
6.9
7.2
9.4
7.8
7.8 
8.6
7.8
7.8
7.2
7.8
7.2
4.4
4.4
7.8
5.3
7.8
7.8
7.8
7.8
7.8
7.8
6.4
7.8
6.7
7.8
6.7
7.8
7.8 
6.7
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